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ABSTRACT
In recent months, Wall Street has been whipped into a frenzy
following the March 31st release of Michael Lewis’ book “Flash
Boys.” In the book, Lewis characterizes the stock market as
being rigged, which has institutional investors and outside
observers alike demanding some sort of SEC action. The vast
majority of this criticism is aimed at high-frequency traders, who
use complex computer algorithms to execute trades several times
faster than the blink of an eye. One of the many complaints
against high-frequency traders is over parasitic trading
practices, such as front-running. Front-running, in the era of
high-frequency trading, is best defined as using the knowledge of
a large impending trade to take a favorable position in the
market before that trade is executed. Put simply, these traders
are able to jump in front of a trade before it can be completed.
This Note explains how high-frequency traders are able to frontrun trades using superior access to information, and examines
several proposed SEC responses.

INTRODUCTION
If asked to envision what trading looks like on the New York
Stock Exchange, most people who do not follow the U.S. securities
market would likely picture a bunch of brokers standing around on the
trading floor, yelling and waving pieces of paper in the air. Ten years ago
they would have been absolutely right, but the stock market has
undergone radical changes in the last decade. It has shifted from one
dominated by manual trading at a physical location to a vast network of
interconnected and automated trading systems.1
Technological advances that simplified how orders are
generated, routed, and executed have fostered the changes in market
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structure, and led to a fragmented marketplace composed of several
exchanges all competing for trade volume.2 For instance, the top three
exchanges by trade volume (NASDAQ, NYSE, and BATS) account for
only 43.6% of total trading volume. 3 This fragmentation was further
driven by SEC instituted regulations that were designed to foster
competition between the exchanges after their privatization in 2005,4
known as Regulation NMS, or National Market System.5
SEC regulation spread the market out, while changes in
technology ballooned the amount of trading and greatly increased the
speed at which it could be done. For instance, in 2005 the NYSE
accounted for over three-quarters of the stock market’s trade volume.6 By
2009 that number had fallen to just 25%; however, average daily trade
volume for the same period had increased more than 650%. 7
Additionally, the time needed to execute a trade for an NYSE listed stock
decreased from an average of ten seconds in 2005 to mere fractions of a
second in 2009.8
This reduction in latency, or trading speed, coupled with the
increased fragmentation and competition between exchanges in recent
years, has given rise to a new phenomenon known as high-frequency
trading (HFT).9 HFT does not have an official definition, but is widely
believed to have a few common characteristics.10 First, high-frequency
traders employ complex computer algorithms that use a defined set of
inputs to automatically make decisions based on changing market
conditions. 11 Second, they make trades very quickly, measured in
milliseconds and even microseconds.12 To put this into perspective, the
2
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average blink of a human eye takes about 400 milliseconds, which is an
eternity to high-frequency traders. 13 Third, they execute a massive
number of trades per day. While it is quite difficult to estimate how many
trades the average HFT firm executes per day, it is estimated that HFT as
a whole accounts for 50–70% of the total trading volume in the U.S.
equities market.14 Fourth, these firms do not hold a position at the end of
the trading day. That is, unlike traditional investors, they do not hold a
significant number of shares of any stock at the end of each day. And
finally, high-frequency traders are proprietary traders, which means, they
are trading with their own money, rather than on behalf of an investor.15
While most high-frequency traders share these characteristics,
the trading strategies they use vary widely.16 Many of these strategies
have been labeled as parasitic,17 and are one of the many reasons HFT
has come under fire recently.18 Parasitic strategies are generally thought
of as those designed to generate profits at the expense of other traders,
without providing some market benefit in return.19 Although the full
merits of HFT are outside the scope of this paper, it will instead focus on
one of the parasitic trading practices employed, known as front-running.
Front-running is defined as using the knowledge of a large,
incoming order to take a favorable position in the market.20 Put simply,
knowing that a large order is incoming, front-running constitutes buying
and immediately relisting that particular stock at a higher price, before
the order is executed. A simple analogy may help illustrate the issue.
Imagine a stockbroker with a serious craving for Cheerios. That broker
13
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checks the price for Cheerios on his phone and sees that they are on sale
for $2.49 at the nearest grocery store. He then places an order for one
box of Cheerios and heads to the store to pick them up. When he gets
there, the manager informs him that unfortunately someone had
purchased all of the boxes of $2.49 cheerios before they were able to fill
his order. Fortunately, however, that same person is happy to sell him a
box for $2.50. Switch Cheerios with shares of Apple, and you have frontrunning in a nutshell, sometimes referred to as an “order-anticipation
strategy.”21 Since it is a parasitic trading strategy, front-running does not
provide any offsetting benefit to the marketplace. Front-runners “profit
only when they can prey on other traders. They do not make prices more
informative, and they do not make markets more liquid.”22 Now in the
analogy above, one cent may not seem like a big deal, but when the
broker starts buying 10,000 or 100,000 boxes of Cheerios at a time, the
issue becomes more apparent.
In the wake of Michael Lewis’ book “Flash Boys,”23 several
predatory strategies have been incorrectly labeled as front-running.
While rebate-arbitrage, 24 latency-arbitrage, 25 and a myriad of other
predatory trading strategies are employed by high–frequency traders,
they do not fall under the domain of order-anticipation strategies, and
thus will not be discussed in this piece. Part I of this Note begins by
briefly explaining the current market structure of the U.S. equities
markets, and highlighting some key regulations in its operation. Part II
moves to discuss exactly how these trades are being front-run and why
this is an issue worth correcting. Part III details what enables highfrequency traders to front-run trades, and Part IV concludes with a
discussion of potential SEC responses.

I. CURRENT MARKET STRUCTURE
The current structure of the U.S. equities market and certain key
regulatory provisions create an environment that makes front-running
21

See, e.g., Richard Livingston, Murky Dangers in Dark Pools, THEAGE (Aug.
25, 2012), http://www.theage.com.au/money/investing/murky-dangers-in-darkpools-20120827-24v9n.html (providing a similar analogy).
22
HARRIS, supra note 17, at 251.
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LEWIS, supra note 13.
24
Rebate-arbitrage is a trading strategy that seeks to capture the incentives, or
kickbacks, many exchanges offer for trading on their exchange without actually
providing the liquidity or volume those incentives are meant to entice. See id. at
172.
25
Latency-arbitrage is generally defined as using extremely fast trading speed to
capture differences in price on multiple exchanges before the exchanges are able
to update listings to reflect the current best market price. See Gomber et al.,
supra note 2, at 29–30.
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possible. The vast majority of equities trading in the U.S. takes place on
one of the nine registered exchanges (e.g., NYSE), or in a dark pool.26
Registered exchanges, as the name implies, have to register with the SEC
and meet certain statutory requirements.27 Dark pools on the other hand,
are essentially unofficial exchanges that are less heavily regulated, and
offer a certain amount of anonymity that is not found on the official
exchanges.28 Both the registered exchanges and dark pools are run by an
automated trading system (ATS) that automatically receives, processes,
and executes orders at extremely high speeds.29 Additionally, registered
exchanges and dark pools are governed by Regulation NMS, or National
Market System, though there are some important differences.30
Regulation NMS was designed to create a linked national market
system and foster competition among the exchanges. 31 This was
accomplished primarily in two ways. First, Regulation NMS created a
consolidated market data system.32 This system collects “consolidated
quote data” and “consolidated trade data.”33 Consolidated quote data is
the record of all the best bids and offers from each of the registered
exchanges.34 Consolidated trade data is the record of every trade that is
executed, even on dark pools or other alternative trading systems.35 This
distinction is the major difference between the registered exchanges and
dark pools. Dark pools are not required to report bids and offers
(consolidated quote data); as such, investors can remain somewhat
anonymous and forgo tipping off the market about a large incoming
trade.36
All of this data is combined into a consolidated data feed, also
known as the Securities Information Processor (SIP), and made available
to all market participants.37 The SIP combines the data from each of the
exchanges to calculate, among other things, the National Best Bid and
26
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Offer prices (NBBO).38 The NBBO is the current best bid and offer price
(to buy and sell, respectively) of every listed stock.39
Second, Regulation NMS implemented something known as the
“Order Protection Rule.”40 This rule requires that any trading venue must
execute an order at the current best price in the nation, or the NBBO.41 If
the venue is unable to do that, (for instance, if the national best price is
not offered on their exchange, or if there are not enough shares to fill the
order) it must either cancel the order or route it to another exchange with
the best price.42 Both the consolidated data market system and the Order
Protection Rule have been fundamental to the rise of front-running
activity in recent years.

II. FRONT-RUNNING
Front-running in the U.S. equities market has developed into a
high-stakes cat and mouse game. As investors discover they are being
front-run, they explore new ways of executing their orders; and in turn,
high-frequency traders develop new tools and methods to front-run
them.43 Currently there are three known ways in which front-running
occurs, depending on how brokers execute the orders; however, the
nature of this trade practice makes it impossible to say whether this is an
exhaustive list. 44 The first two methods are variations of what is
generally known as electronic front-running, while the third is called
dark pool arbitrage.

A. Electronic Front-Running
1. Large Block Orders
The first widely used method of front-running (though used less
often in light of recent events) occurs when an investor submits an order

38

What is a SIP?, supra note 37; Shengwei Ding, John Hanna & Terrence
Hendershott, How Slow Is the NBBO? A Comparison with Direct Exchange
Feeds, 49 THE FIN. REV. 313–14 (2014).
39
Ding, Hanna & Hendershott, supra note 38.
40
See Regulation NMS Release No. 34,51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,501–02
(June 29, 2005).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
It is worth noting that the investors mentioned here are large institutional
investors. Someone trading for his or her personal account, or in relatively small
quantities is at no risk for being front-run. However, this is still relevant to these
individuals, as a large number of institutional investors are pension and
retirement funds.
44
See Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 25; Leis, supra note 15, at 21.
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for a large block of shares.45 Assume that a broker has a client who wants
him to buy 100,000 shares of XYZ Company. The broker checks the
price of XYZ and sees that there are 180,000 shares available at $10.50:
30,000 shares on Exchange 1, 50,000 on Exchange 2, 60,000 on
Exchange 3, and 40,000 on Exchange 4. He submits the order at market
price expecting to receive 100,000 shares for $1,050,000, but instead
somehow ends up paying $1,051,400. Why?
Before the broker ever placed the order, some (or many) highfrequency traders placed a large amount of sell orders in a huge selection
of stocks, one of which happened to be XYZ Company.46 These sell
orders are usually in lots of 100 shares, the minimum required to be at
the front of any price queue.47 As the broker’s 100,000 share order came
into Exchange 1, he purchased all 30,000 shares available at $10.50,
including the sell order from the high-frequency trader. Because
Exchange 1 is not able to fill the entire order at the NBBO, the Order
Protection Rule requires it to send the order elsewhere to get the
remaining 70,000 shares. Now, armed with the knowledge that this order
is on its way to the next exchange, the high-frequency traders race there
before it can be executed and purchase all the available shares of the
stock.48 At this point, they can either sell the shares back to the broker at
an inflated price, say $10.52, or hold them in hopes that the large order
drives the price up even higher.49
2. Sliced Orders
Often times it is not feasible to submit a large block order, such
as when there are not enough shares available at the preferred price.50 In
these instances traders often “slice” their orders or use an algorithm to
break them into smaller pieces that match the market and do not move
the price.51 For example, assume once more that a broker is trying to buy
45

The remainder of the examples will talk exclusively about bids, or purchase
orders, but the methods used are simply reversed for large offer, or sell orders.
46
The most volatile stocks are most often targeted by HFTs, as the price
volatility makes it easier to benefit from price swings. See Equity Market
Structure Literature Review Part II: High Frequency Trading, U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research
/hft_lit_review_march_2014.pdf.
47
LEWIS, supra note 13, at 73.
48
See id. at 172; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3609.
49
See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 172; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at
3609.
50
Korsmo, supra note 4, at 546–48 (explaining that traders often break up large
trades in order to prevent an unfavorable price movement).
51
Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 22; Korsmo, supra note 4, at 546–
48.
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100,000 shares of XYZ Company at $10.50, however, now only 2,000
shares are available at that price. Rather than submitting the entire order
and driving up the price, he uses an algorithm that will buy the 100,000
shares in smaller lots over the next few minutes. Yet again, however, he
ends up overpaying for the shares (or not getting them at all). Why?
This time around there was no large order to race to the next
exchange, but the broker was still front-run. There are three likely ways
in which a high-frequency trader could sniff out a hidden order. First, the
high-frequency traders could have used sophisticated pattern recognition
software that detected a large order by analyzing things such as trade
volume, order size, etc.52 Second, the high-frequency traders could have
identified the broker making the trade by using a latency table.53 A
latency table is a table that can be used to identify traders based on how
long it takes a trade to be routed to an exchange.54 For example, if it
always takes 287 microseconds for a certain broker’s trade to travel
between two specific exchanges, a glance at the latency table will
identify the broker. Once the broker is identified, a simple look at
historical trading data can help predict an incoming trading pattern.
The last and most common way high-frequency traders identify a
sliced order is by repeatedly pinging the exchanges. 55 Pinging or
“sniping” is a process that involves issuing hundreds of “immediate-orcancel” orders in a matter of milliseconds.56 An immediate-or-cancel
order does exactly what you would expect: if it is not filled instantly, the
order gets canceled. High-frequency traders use these orders to rapidly
cycle through a wide range of orders, hoping to stumble upon a large
hidden order.57 Once an order is detected, high-frequency traders will
once again trade in front of the incoming order to capture the resulting
price move.58
The speed at which all of this occurs is nearly incomprehensible.
High-frequency traders place tens of thousands of orders to buy and sell
per second. 59 Algorithms analyze the data these orders generate and
52

SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3609.
LEWIS, supra note 13, at 74. Latency tables are described by an individual
interviewed by Lewis, but no information about them exists otherwise. Though
again, this is highly valuable and proprietary information that HFTs would not
likely divulge.
54
Id.
55
SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3609; Korsmo, supra note 4, at 548.
56
Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 25; Leis, supra note 15, at 24–25.
57
Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 25; Leis, supra note 15, at 24–25.
58
SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3609; Leis, supra note 15, at 24–25.
59
See, e.g., Bad HFT Algo Blasts 2.5 Million Bogus Orders, NANEX RESEARCH
(Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4563.html.
53
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rapidly take a position ahead of predicted incoming orders.60 This all
happens several times faster than you can finish reading this sentence.

B. Dark Pool Arbitrage
In response to much of the electronic front-running, some traders
elected to move large trades into dark pools.61 Because dark pools do not
have to report bids or offers until they are filled, the rationale was that
large orders could be placed in dark pools and sit there until they were
filled with no threat of being front-run by high-frequency traders. 62
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Several dark pools have been
accused of selling access to high-frequency traders and are now facing
lawsuits and regulatory action. 63 Once high-frequency traders have
access to a dark pool, they can easily front-run trades inside. According
to Brad Katsuyama, President of IEX Group, a dark pool designed to
eliminate front-running, “[y]ou could front-run an order in a dark pool on
a bicycle.”64
When an investor places a large order inside a dark pool, the
order should sit hidden until it is matched from within the dark pool, or it
is matched with shares on an official exchange. For instance, if a broker
places an order in a dark pool to buy 100,000 shares of XYZ Company at
$10.50, it should sit until the order can be filled and no one should know
it is there. If 100,000 shares of XYZ Company are offered for sale at
$10.47 somewhere in the market, those shares should be matched with
the buy order waiting in the dark pool. Instead, these orders are
commonly filled at a price between the order and best available share
price, $10.49 for instance.
These trades, though hidden, were once again front-run by highfrequency traders. To detect hidden orders within a dark pool, highfrequency traders utilize the same “pinging” and order cancellation
techniques described above.65 Once an order has been sniffed out, the
60

See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3609.
SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH-SPEED TRADERS, A.I. BANDITS AND
THE THREAT TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2012); Batista, supra note 28;
Allen Wastler, Dark Pools Letting Some Light in Now?, CNBC (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100409045.
62
PATTERSON, supra note 61; Batista, supra note 28.
63
For example, Barclays is facing a suit that alleges they defrauded their
investors by lying about HFTs having access to their dark pool. See Complaint,
Schneiderman v. Barclays Capital Inc., No. 451391/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); see
also Chad Bray, Credit Suisse Is Facing Inquires Over Its ‘Dark Pool’,
NYTIMES DEALBOOK (July 31, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/
credit-suisse-facing-regulatory-inquiries-over-dark-pools/.
64
LEWIS, supra note 13, at 123.
65
See id. at 114–17, 228; Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 12, at 25.
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high-frequency traders will sit on it, waiting for a shift in the market that
would otherwise fulfill the trade,66 such as when 100,000 shares of XYZ
are offered below the $10.50 bid price. At this moment, the highfrequency traders will race to the offered shares, buy them before the
trade can be executed, and then sell them to the order waiting in the dark
pool for the old, now stale, price before it can be updated.67
At the end of the day, all methods of front-running involve HFTs
beating regular investors to the punch and outrunning market orders that
would otherwise be filled. These firms act as a middleman to skim
pennies off of trades that would have been executed in their absence.
High-frequency traders do this without providing a benefit to the
marketplace, 68 such as increased liquidity, or carrying an affirmative
obligation like market makers in the past.69 This is all enabled by HFTs’
speed and informational advantage.

III. INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGE
HFT is dependent on speed; so dependent that firms are willing
to pay tens of thousands of dollars to shave a couple of milliseconds off
of their latency time.70 But these HFT firms are not trying to stay ahead
of institutional investors; rather they are competing against all of the
other HFT firms. The two main ways HFT firms gain a speed advantage,
and in turn informational advantage, is by using direct data feeds and
colocation.

A. Direct v. Consolidated Data Feeds
Regulation NMS created a national consolidated data feed, also
known as the Securities Information Processor (“SIP”). 71 This
consolidated data feed takes trading data from each individual trading
venue and aggregates it into a single feed that represents the NBBO.72
The SIP shows a real time snapshot of the U.S. equities market, and is
66

See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 114–17, 228.
Id.
68
Harris, supra note 17.
69
In the past certain traders known as “specialists” were given premier access to
the marketplace, but in return they had to fulfill certain affirmative obligations.
For example, most specialists were required to maintain active quotes in a
certain market. If one side of a market dried up, they had to actively buy or sell
for that side in order to maintain a certain level of liquidity. See Specialist,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/specialist.asp (last visited
Dec. 28, 2015).
70
See generally LEWIS, supra note 13, at 62-65.
71
SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3600–01.
72
See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3600–01; What is a SIP?, supra
note 37.
67
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used by nearly every investor.73 Even more importantly, the SIP is used
by regulators to determine the NBBO at any particular point in time.
Additionally, the SIP is used by each registered exchange, in at least
some capacity, to price trades and determine the NBBO in their market.74
While the SIP, a consolidated feed, is certainly the most widely
used, it is not the only method to observe the market in real time. The
vast majority of high-frequency traders use a different aggregation
method, known as direct feeds.75 Direct feeds, as the name implies, are
purchased directly from the exchanges and then aggregated by the
purchaser.76 Regulation NMS does not require exchanges to synchronize
data delivery to consolidated and direct feeds, but forbids any one from
providing information to a direct feed faster than the SIP.77 In fact, the
SEC recently fined the NYSE for doing just that.78
If the exchanges are not allowed to provide data to direct feeds
more quickly, why are HFT firms paying tens of thousands of dollars per
month for access? Because even though direct feeds do not provide faster
access, HFT firms are able to aggregate the data and create a picture of
the market much faster than the SIP.79 Exactly how much faster is still up
for debate. In 2010, the SEC estimated the delay between the SIP and
direct data feeds to be less than ten milliseconds.80 However, in 2013
Nanex Research presented evidence that the true delay was in fact twenty
two milliseconds, an eternity in the age of HFT.81 Even using the SEC’s
estimate, their findings stand in opposition of the stance taken in the case
against the NYSE. In the press release, the Director of the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement is quoted as saying, “[i]mproper early access to
market data, even measured in milliseconds, can in today's markets be a

73

The Stock Market’s Perception Problem, NANEX RESEARCH (Aug. 1,
2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4666.html. (The SIP has nearly 2.5 million
subscribers.)
74
Id.
75
See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3606.
76
Ding, Hanna & Hendershott, supra note 38, at 315–16.
77
Regulation NMS Release No. 34,51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567 (June
29, 2005).
78
Matt Krantz, Rigged Market? SEC Busts the NYSE, USA TODAY (May
1, 2014), http://americasmarkets.usatoday.com/2014/05/01/rigged-market-secbusts-the-nyse/.
79
HFT Front Running, All The Time, NANEX RESEARCH (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4442.html.
80
SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3611.
81
HFT Front Running, supra note 79.
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real and substantial advantage that disproportionately disadvantages
retail and long-term investors.”82
Without question, access to direct data feeds provides highfrequency traders with a distinct informational advantage.83 They can get
consolidated market data substantially sooner than other market
participants, enabling them to engage in practices such as front-running
and dark pool arbitrage.

B. Colocation
With all of the trading exchanges now being run by a bank of
computer systems, and without the need for an actual trading floor, one
would expect the physical locations housing the exchanges to shrink. But
in fact, they have grown—some rather substantially.84 This expansion
was fueled by demand from high-frequency traders to locate their trading
systems closer and closer to the exchange system. 85 The practice of
housing your machine inside of an exchange, or “renting a rack,” is
known as colocation.86 The reason high-frequency traders want to be so
close to the exchange server is to reduce the latency between it and their
own systems—that is to reduce the time it takes for messages to travel
between them.87 Data is carried between these machines through fiber
optic cables, which pass messages as rapid flashes of light. Light travels
in a vacuum at 186,000 miles per second, or 186 miles per millisecond.
This speed drops substantially inside a fiber optic cable, and the impact
of reducing distance becomes even greater. Miles are equal to
milliseconds, yards to microseconds, and feet can even be equated to
nanoseconds.88 None of these are perceptible to humans, but in the race
to be first, nanoseconds begin to add up. Colocation services offer a
definite and measurable competitive advantage over other market
participants, and are regarded by many as a clearly unfair practice.89

82

SEC Press Release 2012-189, SEC Charges New York Stock Exchange for
Improper Distribution of Market Data (Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with author).
83
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The primary argument in favor of direct data feeds and
colocation is that these services are available to anyone. However, each
of these services costs tens of thousands of dollars per month, per
exchange. 90 The ability for exchanges to sell direct data feeds and
colocation inside the exchange building creates a two-tiered market
system consisting of those with the resources to purchase an
informational advantage, and those without.91 Regulation NMS, which
was designed to level the playing field, has instead created a marketplace
with stark inequality between participants.
IV. WHY IS THIS PROBLEMATIC?
While the actions of high-frequency traders and the current
equities market structure likely come across as intuitively ‘unfair,’ the
real problem is much more far-reaching. Asymmetric access to
information and an advantageous trade structure92 have resulted in a twotiered system in which the privileged class is able to prey upon the
other.93 Put simply, because some firms are able to purchase faster access
to market information, those who do so have a distinct advantage over
those who do not. This creates a textbook two-tiered system of ‘haves’
and ‘have nots.’ The creation of a two-tiered system is, however, not the
only problem resulting from HFTs and asymmetric information.
Concerns have been raised about a number of issues ranging from
inherent unfairness94 to market destabilization, but a finer discussion of
these problems is beyond the scope of this note.
90

For example, the total fees for all direct data feeds on the BATS exchange
amount to $13,000 per month. Fee schedule available at http://www.batstrading
.com/resources/regulation/rule_book/BZX_Fee_Schedule.pdf.
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See Gomber et al., supra note 2, at 34–35; email from Arnuk & Saluzzi, supra
note 83.
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heavily in favor of HFTs. Exchanges operate in this way in order to capture the
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favoring one type of client over another, a NYSE official did report that they are
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more volume. See Laurie Carver, Exchange Order Types Prompt Fears of HFT
Conspiracy, RISK MAGAZINE (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.risk.net/riskmagazine/feature/2261626/exchange-order-types-prompt-fears-of-hftconspiracy.
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See generally Eliot Lauer, Jason Gottlieb & Alyssa Astiz, High-Frequency
Trading: Are the Exchanges the Next Targets?, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1042
(June 3, 2013), http://www.curtis.com/siteFiles/News/curtis_lauer_gottlieb
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The problems arising from a two-tiered system are severe,
ranging from waning investor confidence to the eventual exit of certain
participants from the marketplace.95 This is especially problematic for
the U.S. equities market, as a well-functioning market for securities is
vital to a robust economy. As investors lose confidence in the ability to
effectively compete or to have their orders filled at the anticipated price,
they are less willing to take action in the market. Some will even exit the
market all together, as evidenced in various empirical studies.96 As fewer
investors are willing to trade shares, the marketplace becomes more
illiquid. Illiquidity directly affects the value of the underlying securities,
and makes it more difficult for companies to secure a large amount of
capital.97 There is some evidence that this phenomenon has already been
occurring.98 For example, the average number of firms going public each
year from 1990-2000 was 530.99 This number has fallen to roughly 125
since 2001, a decrease of over 400%.100 This has a direct and substantial
effect on the economy as a whole.
Some critics claim that colocation and direct data feeds do not
result in a two-tiered market system. The main argument raised is that
these services are available for anyone who wishes to purchase them, and
that the asymmetric information is a result of capitalism that needs no
regulatory intervention.101 This reasoning is flawed for several reasons.
First, the argument that anyone can purchase and utilize these services
information that is unfair, but rather the exploitative use of said information. “It
is thus the use of the technology, rather than the technology itself, that
determines fairness or unfairness.” See James Angel & Douglas McCabe,
Fairness in Financial Markets: The Case of High Frequency Trading, (Dec.
2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737887.
95
See Stephanie Ryder, How to Prevent Future Flash Crashes and Restore the
Ordinary Investors' Confidence in the Financial Market: The Implementation of
Circuit Breakers and Speed Limits to Help Enforce the Market Access Rule, 12
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 265, 281–83 (2014).
96
See, e.g., Computerized Trading: What Should the Rules of the Road Be?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking
and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 20 (2012) (statement of David Lauer) (on file
with author) (“[T]he flight of the retail investor during a period of incredible
stock market returns is a sure sign that this exodus is a result of mistrust rather
than economic conditions.”).
97
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99
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100
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101
See, e.g., Holly A. Bell, High Frequency Trading: Do Regulators Need to
Control this Tool of Informationally Efficient Markets?, CATO INSTITUTE
POLICY ANALYSIS (July 22, 2013), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files
/pubs/pdf/pa731_web_1.pdf.
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presupposes that all parties will benefit from them equally. However, this
is not the case. These very expensive marginal increases in speed are
much more likely to benefit high-frequency traders, who have the ability
to execute thousands of trades per day, more than average institutional
investors, who use more long-term trading strategies.102
Second, while the SEC certainly has no duty to ensure that all
parties are equal, creating barriers between market participants is in
direct opposition with the stated purpose of Regulation NMS.103 In fact,
the SEC has already commented on information asymmetry creating a
two-tiered market system. In the proposed rule to eliminate flash
orders,104 the SEC said, “[t]he flashing of order information could lead to
a two-tiered market in which the public does not have access, through the
consolidated quotation data streams, to information about the best
available prices for U.S.-listed securities that is available to some market
participants through proprietary data feeds.”105 While this release was
focused on flash orders, the conclusions drawn by the SEC apply
nonetheless. Informational asymmetries allow certain high-frequency
traders to engage in predatory trading practices that take advantage of
other investors who are not able or willing to pay for the same premier
access to information. This two-tiered system is hazardous to the health
of the equities market, and in turn to the economy as a whole.

V. POTENTIAL SEC RESPONSES
While there have been a myriad of proposed responses to the
problems this type of predatory trading generates, the more promising of
these can be divided into target responses, and market and regulatory
reforms. Targeted responses aim solely at combating the negative effects
of HFT, whereas market and regulatory reforms seek to understand and
reform the underlying issues that gave rise to this type of behavior.

A. Targeted Responses
1. Redefinition in the HFT Era
One of the major issues with policing HFT abuses is the
definitional divide between HFT and LFT (low-frequency trading).
Front-running, for example, can be defined as trading on the basis of
102

Michael A. Goldstein, Pavitra Kumar, and Frank C. Graves, Computerized
and High-Frequency Trading, 49 THE FIN. REV. 2, 177–202 (2014).
103
SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 3600–01.
104
Now banned, the term flash order describes a practice in which exchanges
used to flash new incoming order information to users with direct feeds fractions
of a second before that information was released to the public.
105
Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 74
Fed. Reg. 48,632, 48,634 (proposed Sept. 18, 2009).
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non-public information about an upcoming trade in the same security.106
To prove wrongdoing under this definition, one must show the
possession of non-public information, and that a trade based on that
information actually occurred. Before HFT, information was non-public
if it had “not been disseminated in a manner which makes it generally
available to the trading public through recognized channels of
distribution.”107 In the world of HFT, however, this definition breaks
down. Is information public if some traders have access to it before
others? Does the analysis change if everyone can assess the information
simultaneously, but only by paying a fee? What if anyone can access
individual pieces of information, but only by using an algorithm to
consolidate the pieces can you see the whole puzzle?
The ban on front-running, and other similar prohibitions, were
enacted to protect traders, but only from abuses in the manner of trading
at the time. In the past decade, trading has evolved, but the definitions in
these protections have not. The SEC should consider amending many of
the provisions banning front-running, and other parasitic trading
practices, to reflect the evolution of the equities market. However, as
shown above, the SEC must be careful to strike a delicate balance
between protecting investors and stifling innovation.
2. Real Time Monitoring
Another difficulty with policing predatory trading is
reconstructing what actually happened in the market. An enormous
amount of trading data is generated every day. For example, on January
30th, 2015, there were 5,766,661 trades executed on the NYSE.108 The
number of orders generated daily is in the tens of billions. Wading
through all of this data is a monumental task, to say the least. Following
the flash crash on May 6th, 2010, it took regulators several months to
reconstruct less than an hour of trading data. 109 This prompted the
creation of the CAT, or consolidated audit trail.
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See Exchange Act Release No. 14156, 1977 WL 190058 (Nov. 9, 1977).
Jerry W. Markham, ‘Front-Running’ — Insider Trading Under the
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Speech to 11th Annual SIFMA Market Structure Conference: Market
Participants and the May 6 Flash Crash (Oct. 13, 2010).
107

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

272

The CAT is designed to capture and consolidate all customer and
order event information across all exchanges.110 This will, in theory,
allow the SEC to more effectively regulate against illegal trading
practices. 111 The final rule, passed in July of 2012, has yet to be
implemented. As of February 2015, it is currently undergoing
amendments concerning the “Process of Selecting a Plan Processor and
Developing a Plan for the Consolidated Audit Trail.”112 Having a fully
constructed record of all market data will be very useful during the
investigation of significant market events, but probably not so much
otherwise. Even if the information is readily available, it will still be an
arduous task for regulators to wade through the sheer volume of activity
in the marketplace. While this is certainly a step in the right direction, the
SEC should consider adding some form of real-time monitoring to the
CAT. This could likely be accomplished with an algorithm (like the ones
used by HFTs) designed to flag suspicious trading activity for immediate
action. Real-time monitoring would increase the usefulness of the CAT,
while reducing the amount of time regulators have to spend wading
through the audit trail.
3. Speed Bumps
Another potential response is an SEC mandated speed bump.
This speed bump would be an intentional delay between when orders are
received and when they are executed at each of the exchanges. While
speed is paramount in today’s trading environment, this delay would be
on the scale of a few milliseconds or even microseconds. It would be
small enough that only traders employing these HFT strategies would be
affected.
A speed bump works by eliminating any advantage of getting
there first, which is what allows high-frequency traders to front-run
trades. A uniform delay on all trades, however, will not accomplish that
goal. If an exchange were to delay all trades by, say, 0.5 seconds, HFT
orders that got there first would still end up being executed first. The
solution to that problem is a randomized delay. If an exchange were to
implement a randomized delay that ranges from 10 to 200 milliseconds,
for example, the first order to arrive at the exchange will not necessarily
be the first one executed. 113 This eliminates the pseudo first-mover
110

See Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 67457, 104 SEC
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111
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advantage that HFTs gain through colocation and other informational
and speed advantages. In fact, a few unofficial exchanges and dark pools
have already been implementing some type of speed bump to curb HFT
activity.114
One of the more successful dark pools, known as IEX, has used a
slightly different strategy to create a speed bump. Instead of creating a
randomized delay, IEX elected to eliminate the speed and information
advantage HFT firms get from being physically close to the exchange
servers. To do so IEX wrapped 32 miles of fiber optic cable and placed it
in a box right outside the exchange.115 To connect to IEX, traders have to
travel through these miles of cable, which creates a delay of roughly 350
microseconds.116 This delay gives IEX enough time to process and route
trades to any exchange in the country before high-frequency traders have
time to receive and act on that information.
Currently IEX operates as a dark pool, but it has plans to
eventually become a registered exchange. 117 However, there is some
question about whether IEX’s signature speed bump would be allowed to
remain in place should it become registered.118 Regulation NMS, which
governs the registered exchanges, contains some language that may be in
conflict with an intentional speed bump. Specifically, regarding the
immediate fulfillment of orders, Regulation NMS states that
‘immediate,’ “precludes any coding of automated systems or other type
of intentional device that would delay the action taken with respect to a
quotation."119 Despite this language, there is some speculation that the
SEC will revisit that provision if IEX applies to become an official
exchange, given its rising popularity as a dark pool.120
Additionally, various countries outside of the United States have
implemented speed bumps in an effort to combat predatory trading by
114
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high-frequency traders. The most successful of these speed bumps has
been the one implemented by the E.U. The European Parliament
unanimously voted in 2012 to impose a half-second speed limit on
traders using computer algorithms to execute trades.121 This limit remains
in effect today, and has evidently been successful in curbing some
predatory trading.
4. Order Randomization
Order randomization is an idea that has been advanced along
with speed bumps. Order randomization functions by grouping orders
into batches as they arrive at an exchange. Once the orders are split into
smaller lots, they are randomized before being executed. The underlying
logic is that the first order to arrive will not necessarily be the first one
executed. While this sounds great at first glance, it does not eliminate the
HFT advantage. To overcome order randomization, high-frequency
traders need only submit a huge amount of orders, even more than they
do currently. 122 The orders coming in to an exchange using order
randomization are broken into smaller batches that make it possible to
randomize them without an impact processing speed. In other words, all
orders inside a very small time window are randomized. To overcome
this, high-frequency traders need only send hundreds and hundreds of
orders all at the same time. The more HFT orders that get submitted, the
more HFT orders make it into each batch. The law of large numbers tells
us that the probability of an HFT order being executed first will
eventually rise to a near certainty.
Nevertheless, order randomization still has its merits. This
strategy can be effectively used in conjunction with a speed bump or
other randomized delay.123 This combination has shown some limited
success thus far.124

121

See Derek Klobucher, Europe Takes Control of High-Speed Trading,
FORBES (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2012/10/02/europetakes-control-of-high-speed-trading/.
122
LEWIS, supra note 13, at 174.
123
Wanfeng Zhou & Nick Olivari, Exclusive: EBS Take New Step to Rein in
High-Frequency Traders, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.reuters.com
/article/2013/08/23/us-markets-forex-hft-idUSBRE97M0YJ20130823.
124
Joel Clark, Thomson Reuters to Trial Randomization on FX Matching
Platform, EuroMoney (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.euromoney.com/Article
/3323308/Thomson-Reuters-to-trial-randomization-on-FX-matchingplatform.html (explaining Thomson Reuters is implementing the system
pioneered by EBS, who has recently rolled it out to all of their products
offerings after a 6 month trial period).

275

INFORMATIONAL INEQUALITY

[Vol. 14

5. Order Taxation
Order taxation is a response aimed at HFT as a whole, not
specifically front-running. While such a tax could take many iterations,
the general idea is that a very small tax would be placed on all trades.
This tax would not have a noticeable effect on those taking long
positions, but would be devastating to HFT firms who operate on very
thin spreads. Order taxation has seen mixed reception, but has garnered
some notable supporters in recent months, including Nobel laureate
Joseph Stiglitz.125
Despite the increased support, a flat tax on all trades is a heavyhanded approach that may even incentivize more predatory trading as
legitimate HFT firms have their profit margins regulated away. In fact,
some of the negative effects of a broad tax can be seen in France and
Italy, who in 2012 both instituted a tax on all trades occurring in 0.5
seconds or faster.126 While European trading volume as a whole was up
14% from 2012 to 2013, the volumes in Italy and France both fell over
10%.127 Whether this will have a long-term impact on those markets
remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, a trade tax may still prove useful. A tax designed
to target only predatory trading strategies, for instance, could be useful in
curbing such activity. For example, a tax that applies only on trades
made above a certain order-to-trade ratio may deter activities such as
quote stuffing, which have no place in a legitimate trading strategy. A tax
alone, however, is unlikely to solve the issue at hand, but it could be a
valuable tool in conjunction with other potential SEC responses.

B. Equities Market and Regulatory Review
1. Regulation NMS Review
Regulation NMS was intended to increase competition among
the exchanges, and in doing so has resulted in a highly fragmented
marketplace. 128 This fragmentation and other key provisions of
Regulation NMS have created an environment rife with predatory trading
125
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activity.129 The intention behind Regulation NMS was sound, but as the
market has evolved, so must its regulations. Many market participants,
including institutional investors, exchanges, and SEC officials, have
called for a review of Regulation NMS.130 Echoing the thoughts of many,
SEC member Luis Aguilar has called for regulators to review “whether
Regulation NMS has created too much fragmentation and fostered an
unreliable complexity in markets.”131
The key Regulation NMS provision under fire is the Trade
Through Rule. As mentioned above, this rule requires brokers to accept
the lowest (or highest) price available when purchasing (or selling) a
stock, regardless of the exchange it is on.132 It does not allow them to
“trade through” on a single marketplace at an inferior price.133 These
rules were designed to protect investors from brokers making unsavory
deals not in their best interest, but in reality, they have forced brokers to
split up orders and route them to multiple exchanges, which has made it
easier for HFT firms to front-run their trades.134 Many have called for a
review of the current trade through rule, most notably among them SEC
Commissioner Dan Gallagher, 135 who has said, “I believe the tradethrough rule is a prime example of regulatory distortion of market
competition.”136 A reconsideration of this rule may allow investors to
consider when the costs of taking an inferior price outweigh the risks of
being front-run by high-frequency traders. Overall, a comprehensive
review of Regulation NMS would go a long way in repairing the current
market environment that allows predatory traders to thrive.
129
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2. Structural Reform
While the responses above have shown some limited success, the
best way for the SEC to curb front-running and other predatory trading
practices by high-frequency traders is to implement broad reforms to the
current market structure. While a Band-Aid fix may temporarily resolve
the problem, the best practice would be to revisit the regulations and
market evolutions that allowed these activities to arise in the first place.
The first, most troublesome issue that the SEC should consider is that
regulated exchanges are catering to HFT firms at the expense of every
other investor.137 The exchanges are selling faster access to information
in the form of direct data feeds and colocation services. Allowing some
users to pay for faster access to information has resulted in a textbook
two-tiered marketplace, with HFT firms at the top and everyone else at
the bottom.138
The biggest divide between high-frequency traders and
traditional investors is the use of direct versus consolidated data feeds.
Direct data feeds provide a picture of the current market several times
faster than the consolidated feed, which in the era of lightning fast
electronic trading, may as well be an eternity.139 SEC Chairwoman Mary
Jo White recognizes the disparity between the consolidated feed, or SIP,
and direct feeds, and plans to “continue efforts to minimize latency.”140
She also plans to ask the exchanges to include a timestamp on
consolidated trade data, which will allow investors using the SIP to judge
exactly how delayed that data is, and to determine if the SIP fits their
informational needs.141 While more transparency is always good, making
the shortcomings of the SIP more identifiable does not change the fact
that investors either have to settle for slow information or else pay tens
of thousands of dollars per month for faster access. The only real
solution to the problem is for the SEC to either spend the substantial
amount of money it would take to eliminate the sizeable gap between the
SIP and direct feeds, or to prohibit exchanges from selling raw data
entirely.
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Colocation, while a part of the same issue, is a slightly more
difficult problem to solve. If you cease to allow HFT firms to locate their
servers inside the exchange building, they will just move them across the
street to a private location as close to the exchange as possible. The only
way to prevent the inevitable battle for real estate is to mandate that
anyone who wants to connect to these exchanges must do so from a
specified point of contact. While this idea may seem outlandish, it is not
entirely without precedent. The SEC allowed the NYSE to force anyone
who did not want to pay for colocation to connect at a specified location.
The SEC could solve the colocation problem by instituting a similar
requirement, just in reverse. Anyone who wants access to these
exchanges must connect from this place. That would effectively
eliminate the problem of colocation.
The last potential reform to be considered is one that would limit
the ability of high-frequency traders to use predatory trading practices.
This is known as a negative trading obligation. Negative trading
obligations are nothing new, and have been a requirement for various
classes of traders in the past.142 The most practical of these proposed
obligations is a maximum order-to-trade ratio. As discussed before, one
way HFT firms detect a large incoming trade is by submitting massive
amounts of orders, in the hope that one of these collides with a hidden
order. A maximum order-to-trade ratio would curb this practice by
forcing HFT firms to maintain a certain amount of executed trades per
order, and barring them from submitting hundreds of orders which they
never intend to fill. Of course, this limit could have the potential side
effect of “reducing market participants' ability to react to market
exogenous events, but there is always a trade off between tighter
regulation and market efficiency.”143
In January 2015, the SEC announced the creation of a “new
Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee, which will focus on the
structure and operations of the U.S. equities markets.”144 This committee
is comprised of experts from different areas of the financial services
industry, but there have been some questions about the impartiality of
their selection. Most notably, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz had his
nomination blocked after making public his views on HFTs.145 Despite
142
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the concerns about its composition, this committee is a promising first
step toward a reevaluation of the current equities market structure that
has resulted in a harmful two-tiered marketplace.

CONCLUSION
In the past decade the U.S. securities market has undergone
drastic changes due to the exponential growth of technology. These
technological advances have enabled us to trade more quickly and
efficiently than ever before. However, some high-frequency traders are
leveraging the technological and informational advantages created by a
two-tiered marketplace to prey on other investors. These high-frequency
traders are paying for expensive services like colocation and direct data
feeds that give them an information and speed advantage that can be used
to front-run the trades of institutional investors. This informational
asymmetry has resulted in a two-tiered system in which the privileged
class is receiving market information before everyone else. Highfrequency traders are using this premier access to information to prey on
institutional investors. By jumping in front of these orders, highfrequency traders enact a pseudo-tax on other investors without
providing any benefit in return. The SEC has acknowledged the need to
curtail predatory trading such as front-running and has multiple options
to consider. A band-aid fix aimed exclusively at front-running, such as a
speed bump or order randomization, could be very effective in the short
term. However, the U.S. equities market would be much better served if
the SEC committed itself to a structural reform and examined the
regulations and market structure that have created an environment that is
so hospitable to predatory trading.
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